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Focus Article
Sequential climate change policy
Edward A. Parson1,2∗ and Darshan Karwat3
Successfully managing global climate change will require a process of sequential,
or iterative, decision-making, whereby policies and other decisions are revised
repeatedly over multiple decades in response to changes in scientific knowledge,
technological capabilities, or other conditions. Sequential decisions are required by
the combined presence of long lags and uncertainty in climate and energy systems.
Climate decision studies have most often examined simple cases of sequential
decisions, with two decision points at fixed times and initial uncertainties that
are resolved at the second decision point. Studies using this formulation initially
suggested that increasing uncertainty favors stronger immediate action, while
the prospect of future learning favors weaker immediate action, but subsequent
work with more general formulations showed that the direction of either effect is
indeterminate, depending on multiple elements of model structure and parameter
values. Current issues in sequential climate decision-making include assessing
responses to potential slow learning or negative learning, and examining the
implications of various mechanisms by which current decision-makers may seek
to influence future decisions by altering the choice sets, knowledge states, marginal
costs and benefits, or default procedural requirements faced by future decision-
makers.  2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Clim Change 2011 2 744–756 DOI: 10.1002/wcc.128
INTRODUCTION
Responding to global climate change is a problemof sequential, or iterative, decision-making. This
means that decisions—by policy-makers, investors,
and others—probably will be, and rational decisions
must be, made and revised repeatedly over time in
response to new knowledge, accumulated experience,
or changed conditions. The changes to which future
decisions will respond may come from new scientific
knowledge about climate change and associated
impacts and risks. Alternatively, they may be related
to changes in technologies or other capabilities for
response, with their associated performance, costs,
and risks. There may also be changes in societal
goals, priorities, or other factors. Sequential decision-
making is required both for mitigation decisions
to limit anthropogenic emissions and other drivers
of climate change and for adaptation decisions to
limit the harms from climate changes that cannot be
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avoided. If geoengineering interventions to alter the
climate’s response to increases in greenhouse gases
are considered, these will also require sequential
decision-making over time. The time horizon over
which sequential decision-making continues may
range from several decades to several centuries—either
until human societies have transitioned to a state
in which they impose no further net climate
forcing or until, for whatever reason, global climate
change has ceased to be a matter of concern. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
recognized the need for sequential decision-making
in the synthesis of the Fourth Assessment Report,1
stating that ‘Responding to climate change involves
an sequential risk management process that includes
both adaptation and mitigation . . .’ (p. 64).
SEQUENTIAL CLIMATE CHANGE
DECISIONS: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS
Why must climate decision-making be sequential? In
practical terms, it is because today’s decision-makers
care about both present and future consequences,
but lack the ability either to create a complete
intertemporal response to climate change in a single
stroke or to identify what such a complete response
should be. In addition to whatever political and
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institutional constraints they face, today’s decision-
makers also lack this ability due to two structural
characteristics of the climate issue that establish
the need for sequential decisions in analytic terms:
inertia and uncertainty. Long lags and inertia are
present at several points in the climate and energy
systems. Current mitigation actions affect emissions
slowly, as new investments, innovations, or behavioral
changes spread through the economy and society.
In turn, changes in the flow of emissions only
slowly modify the accumulated stock of atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations. Furthermore, changes
in concentrations exert only a slow influence on
climate, due to inertia in the climate system arising
mainly from the large heat capacity of the oceans.
Given these lags, even extreme immediate actions to
influence emission trends may take decades to produce
a discernible climate response.
The climate and energy systems also exhibit
large and persistent uncertainties. Although scientific
research has established the reality, human cause,
and future continuation of climate change essentially
beyond doubt, there remain large quantitative
uncertainties in projecting the rate, magnitude, and
specific consequences of future change. Quantitative
uncertainties also pervade projections of the feasibility
and cost of alternative responses,2–4 which strongly
affect what responses are preferred. If climate change
and its effects were known to lie near the lowest,
least destructive end of the present uncertainty range
or if responses to limit climate change were known
to be highly costly and disruptive, smaller and
later responses would be favored; if climate change
damages were known to lie near the highest, most
dangerous end of the uncertainty range or if responses
were known to be cheap and easy, stronger and earlier
efforts would be favored.
It is the presence of both inertia and uncertainty
that makes sequential decision-making necessary. This
can be illustrated by considering the counterfactual
situations with only one of these characteristics
present. With inertia but no uncertainty, an optimal
trajectory of responses over time could be identified
immediately. These responses would be tuned to the
climate system’s lags and inertia to push just the
right amount at the right time. But while specific
actions would vary over time, they would do so in
line with a plan that could be fully specified today,
and thus decision-making would not have to be truly
sequential. On the other hand, with uncertainty but
no inertia, optimal responses at each time could be
determined based on observed conditions, knowledge,
and uncertainties at that time. Any climate change
or impacts occurring would be fully addressed in
real time, and no action to address future changes
would be warranted. But the presence of both inertia
and uncertainty makes either of these simplified
approaches to decision-making infeasible. Because of
inertia, efforts to manage future risks must begin in
advance. Because of uncertainty, these efforts must
be based on uncertain projections of their effects.
They are thus subject to error, so the trajectory of
decisions must be adjusted over time in response
to new information about risks and capabilities,
costs, and benefits. Moreover, given that the need
for future adjustments and knowledge to inform
them is evident today, part of the task for current
decisions is to establish conditions to support these
future adjustments and to do research that aims to
provide the knowledge to inform them.
This article discusses the implications of the
sequential character of climate decisions and reviews
the analyses of climate change decisions that have
examined these, with particular focus on what they
mean for near-term decisions. In particular, this article
discusses and reviews the following: (1) why the most
widely used climate decision models have been unable
to examine the implications of sequential decisions,
(2) the main results of studies that have focused
on sequential decisions, (3) current work in two
areas where achieving more decision-relevant insights
requires further advances in modeling and analysis
of sequential decisions, and (4) specific decisions and
issues faced by current decision-makers that could
be informed by a more sophisticated treatment of
sequential decisions, whether via formal modeling or
other methods of inquiry.
TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTY
AND INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE
IN CLIMATE CHANGE ANALYSES
The most widely used tools for analysis of climate
change decisions have been integrated assessment
models (IAMs), which combine representations of
the economy and energy system that produce
greenhouse gas emissions with representations of
resultant radiative forcing, climate change, and
impacts. Building on energy modeling approaches
initially developed in the 1970s, IAMs saw a surge of
activity in the 1990s coincident with the first serious
policy attention to climate change. Major reviews
of IAMs include Weyant et al.,5 Parson and Fisher-
Vanden,6 Rotmans and Dowlatabadi,7 and Kelly and
Kolstad.8
IAMs take various approaches to representing
climate decision-making, but most presume optimal
climate policy-making by a unitary agent. The
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optimization can represent a single global decision-
maker or separate decisions for each of the
several major world regions and can use various
specific formulations, including minimizing the cost
of meeting specified energy service demands or
maximizing the social utility of consumption. Climate
change damages may enter the optimization through
effects on utility or productivity. The optimization is
typically conducted at discrete decision points, over a
time horizon of 100–300 years.
With a few exceptions discussed below, most
IAM studies have not allowed significant treatment
of sequential climate decisions due to restrictive
representations of both intertemporal decision-
making and uncertainty. Intertemporal decisions
in IAMs have been represented by two extreme
approaches. In the first, optimization at each decision
point is done separately, or ‘myopically’, based
on conditions at that time. These conditions may
include constraints, such as the current capital stock,
that are the legacy of prior decisions. But the
myopic optimization takes no account of future
conditions or consequences except by proxy via
current rates of return on investment. In the second
approach, based on the Ramsey framework of optimal
economic growth modeling, a single intertemporal
optimization is performed for the entire time horizon,
which specifies decisions at every point within
the horizon. Neither of these approaches allows
meaningful treatment of sequential decision-making
under uncertainty, however. Myopic, period-by-
period decisions make no attempt to advance future
benefits, so future decisions are not adjustments to new
information, but merely new static decisions made in
response to new, current conditions. Intertemporal
optimization, on the other hand, specifies the entire
time path of decisions jointly, and so allows no
possibility for mid-course learning, reassessing, and
changing decisions. In fact, excluding such mid-course
adjustments is one of the conditions that defines an
optimal intertemporal decision path.
The ability to examine sequential decisions has
also been constrained by the treatment of uncertainty
in most IAM studies. Uncertainty analysis in IAMs
is becoming more sophisticated, moving beyond
point estimates and sensitivity analysis toward studies
that propagate exogenous probability distributions of
input parameters through to model outputs or that
integrate observations to constrain distributions of
model parameters.9–13 Regardless of what form is used
to represent uncertain characteristics or knowledge
about them, however, if these do not change over
time they cannot represent the learning that is central
to sequential decision-making. A few studies have
adopted alternative methods to study intertemporal
climate decisions, including both optimal-control and
formal feedback-control methods,14–16 but treatments
of these methods to date have also allowed only
limited examination of sequential decision-making
under uncertainty.
To date, model studies that have constructed
future emission scenarios to represent either low-
cost pursuit of environmental goals or optimal
balancing of mitigation and impacts have adopted
these simplified treatments of intertemporal decisions
and uncertainty.17–19 There are good justifications
for adopting these simplifications in climate decision
modeling. Introducing multiple decision stages in
complex nonlinear optimization problems with
multiple uncertainties being resolved over time poses
large computational burdens. Moreover, representing
sequential decision structures requires choosing
specific structures for the evolution of information
about uncertainties over time and the intertemporal
structure of decisions from a complex set of
possibilities, raising the risk that any particular
choice may appear arbitrary. Still, these studies
and the emission scenarios generated from them
cannot represent sequential decision-making, because
uncertainties are not revealed over time and because
the specification of decision-making either takes no
account of future effects or fixes a complete trajectory
of responses with a single decision.
REPRESENTING SEQUENTIAL
DECISIONS IN ANALYSES OF CLIMATE
CHANGE DECISION-MAKING
For an analysis of climate change decisions to
allow investigation of sequential decisions, it must
satisfy three conditions. First, there must be
more than one decision point, separated in time.
One-time specification of all decisions over the
relevant time horizon—whether this reflects full
intertemporal optimization or a granting of authority
to the first-period decision-maker to fix all future
responses—allows no opportunity to act on what
may be learned over time, and so is not consistent
with a sequential approach. Second, uncertainties
and decision-makers’ knowledge about them must
change over time. Without such change there can
be no learning, thus no reason to adjust a decision
relative to prior plans nor any benefit in the ability
to make such future adjustments. Third, decision-
makers must care about the future—a condition that
is required for a sequential approach, but not unique to
it. Otherwise, preferred choices at each decision point
can be identified solely on the basis of decisions of
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conditions at that time. While these three conditions
are necessary for an analysis to examine sequential
decision-making, they do not exhaust the issues that
can be examined within a sequential framework, as the
following section on ‘challenges for further analysis’
will discuss.
Studies of climate decision-making that meet
these conditions and thus are relevant to sequential
decisions have specified the intertemporal structure
of the decision problem and the development of
knowledge and uncertainty over time in various
ways and have addressed several distinct but related
questions. In addition to using the simplest possible
specification of the decision-maker (a single unitary
actor) and choice set (either a binary choice or
one quantitative choice of mitigation stringency
at each choice point), most have specified the
simplest possible time structure of decisions that is
compatible with a sequential approach: two decision
points, with information available at various points
relative to these. Initial studies examined the effect
of information becoming available either before or
after the first decision, comparing the ‘act-then-learn’
(ATL) sequence in which the initial choice must
be made under uncertainty, with the ‘learn-then-
act’ (LTA) sequence in which uncertainty is resolved
before this choice. Distinguishing these two sequences
allows study of hedging strategies and the value of
information. In comparing the two sequences, LTA
always has a better expected outcome (or strictly
speaking, no worse), because it allows the best choice
to be made given the true state of the world. The
difference in value between the two sequences is the
value of the information provided, while the best
choice available under ATL identifies how best to
hedge against the uncertainty before it is resolved.
Using many different models and formulations,
these studies showed that when initial climate
decisions must be made under uncertainty, the best
choices lie between those that would be optimal under
the various possible resolutions of the uncertainty.
For example, if under one resolution the best near-
term choice is little or no early mitigation, while
under another it is aggressive early mitigation, the
preferred choice under uncertainty hedges between
these alternatives with moderate near-term mitigation.
After uncertainty is resolved, preferred decisions
diverge depending on the particular outcome revealed,
converging toward the respective optimal choices
given each resolution. These studies also provided
quantitative estimates of the value of earlier resolution
of these uncertainties.20–22 When the timing of
information or the extent to which the prior
uncertainties were resolved by the new information
were varied, earlier and more complete resolution of
uncertainties increased the value of information, as
expected.21,23
A different design for a two-period hedging
analysis was presented by Hammitt et al.,24 who
treated the future choice of a global warming limit
(along with climate sensitivity) as a first-period
uncertainty, rather than having the model calculate
the preferred limit based on specified benefits and
costs. They examined what values of the later revealed
uncertainties made it best to start with strong action
under uncertainty and found, in line with intuition,
that stronger early action was preferred in cases where
it was later learned that climate sensitivity was high
and the desired warming target was low.
The question most often posed in these two-
period analyses has been the effect of uncertainty and
future learning on the preferred or optimal choice
for immediate action. In examining these questions,
studies have sought to apply to climate change
insights drawn from prior theory on investment under
uncertainty. When the consequences of an investment
decision are uncertain but the uncertainty is expected
to be resolved in the future, there is a value to delaying
the decision to acquire more information, because the
decision can then respond optimally to what is learned.
This additional value from learning and the ability to
delay decisions was formalized in the concepts of
option and quasi-option value. It is closely linked
to the irreversibility of decisions, because it is in
the ability to avoid regret from an initial irreversible
decision that is later found to be wrong that the option
to delay the decision acquires value.25–28
The concepts of irreversible decisions, uncer-
tainty, and learning are clearly applicable to climate
decisions. To avoid confusion, however, it is impor-
tant to specify precisely the conditions of the com-
parison by which uncertainty or learning is varied,
especially to avoid confounding these with changes
in aggregate costs or benefits of action. For example,
in considering the effect of increasing uncertainty on
preferred near-term climate action, many assessments
suggest that the distribution of climate impacts is
positively skewed, combining a high probability of
moderate damages with a long right tail of poten-
tial extreme impacts. If uncertainty is introduced to
an analysis by adding such an extreme possibility or
increasing its probability, this shifts the distribution
of outcomes and the mean toward greater damages.
Absent offsetting changes, this shift will favor stronger
action to avoid climate change, but this is at least
partly due to the overall shift toward worse outcomes,
as opposed to an effect of increasing uncertainty.
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Examining the effect of uncertainty requires introduc-
ing it as mean-preserving spreads in climate damages
or other uncertain parameters. Similarly, examining
the effect of learning requires comparing situations
that are the same except for the presence or absence
of learning. In a two-period analysis, this means com-
paring the situation in which a given uncertainty is
resolved before the second decision point to that in
which the second decision must be made under the
same uncertainties as the first.
Initial studies of these comparisons found results
in line with those drawn from the investment
literature: more uncertainty favors stronger near-
term emission cuts, while future learning partly
offsets this effect, favoring weaker near-term cuts.23,29
The intuition for these results is that with either
convex climate damages or risk aversion, increasing
uncertainty in damages increases near-term mitigation
to reduce the contribution of high-damage outcomes.
At the same time, learning acts against this effect and
favors less immediate action, so future actions can be
optimally tuned to the true state of the world.
Subsequent studies have shown, however, that
neither of these results is fully general. For example,
in contrast to investment decisions—in which the
investment is irreversible, but the decision not to
invest can be reversed—irreversibilities in climate
decisions can go in both directions: commitment to
irreversible climate damages resulting from too little
mitigation and sunk costs from investment in too
much mitigation. Under these conditions, the objective
function does not exhibit the strict convexity needed to
give a unidirectional result. Consequently, the effects
of both uncertainty and learning can go in either
direction, depending on the details of which curvature
and which irreversibility dominate.30–32
Several authors have demonstrated this potential
for both uncertainty and learning to make the
preferred near-term action either stricter or weaker
(including the possibility that the effects of uncertainty
and learning go in the same direction) and have
explored how these effects vary with parameters in
particular model formulations. For example, Summers
and Zeckhauser33 examined the effect of a mean-
preserving increase in climate-damage uncertainty
on the fraction of total two-period cuts made
immediately. Webster34 and Lange and Treich35 both
compared optimal immediate cuts under ‘learning’
and ‘no-learning’ scenarios using simple dynamic
programming models, while Webster34 repeated the
comparison using the Integrated Global System
Model. These studies found that the direction of
uncertainty and learning depended on multiple aspects
of model structure, including specification of the
objective function, the identity and distributions of
uncertain quantities, and on parameter values defining
the curvature of the mitigation and damage cost
functions. It is important to note, however, that
all multi-period analyses, even those in which the
effect of future learning reduces preferred near-term
action, still show that some immediate action is
warranted, particularly in studies using IAMs with
realistic characterization of mitigation costs and
climate damages. For example, Yohe et al.36 found
that an immediate carbon price of about $10 per ton
was robust to a wide range of uncertainties, while
Harvey37 found that only the most extreme favorable
resolution of uncertainties in climate sensitivity and
the threshold for dangerous warming avoided the need
for strong near-term reductions.
CHALLENGES FOR FURTHER
ANALYSES
These analyses have offered significant insights, but
all make substantial simplifications to the factors
affecting actual climate decisions. Of these, the two
that are potentially most important, and which
therefore provide the richest ground for further
analysis, are the treatment of uncertainty and learning,
and the treatment of linkages between decisions made
at different times and constraints operating on these.
These are both areas of active current work.
Characterizing Uncertainty and Learning
Current analyses use simplified treatments of
uncertainties and learning, with regard to what
uncertainties are considered and how knowledge
about these uncertainties is presumed to advance over
time. Regarding what uncertainties are considered,
most studies use probability distributions of specified
model parameters such as coefficients and exponents
in mitigation cost and climate damage functions.
Uncertainty over alternative models or causal
structures is not represented, except for a few cases
that subsume these into parameter variation, e.g., by
letting the distribution for a coefficient include the
value zero, thereby turning off the relevant model
process. In addition, a few studies have presented
probability distributions for a goal or preferred action
that will be known in the future, thereby abstracting
from all the uncertainties in mitigation costs, climate
impacts, and preferences that would determine such
a goal. Regarding progress of knowledge, most
studies presume autonomous resolution of parameter
uncertainties over time, not requiring any expenditure
or exploratory decisions to achieve this. The presumed
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future resolution is usually total, occurring at a fixed,
known time, while some studies vary the timing
or degree of resolution to examine the resultant
diminution in the value of information.
There are several directions in which represen-
tation of uncertainties and learning could advance
to provide more useful representation of sequen-
tial decisions to inform policy and decision-making.
First, despite some efforts and progress, the connec-
tion between abstract uncertainty as represented in
climate decision models and the uncertainty that char-
acterizes current scientific, technical, and economic
understanding of climate change remains weak. Sci-
entific assessments such as the IPCC are increasingly
attempting to report uncertainties quantitatively, e.g.,
by linking the use of textual terms such as ‘likely’
to specified probability ranges. Still, the mapping of
such statements about current scientific understanding
onto parameters in climate decision models is in most
cases highly indirect and not obvious.
The two points of closest approach between
these two descriptions of uncertainty are global
climate sensitivity—the global mean temperature
response to a doubling preindustrial atmospheric
CO2—and the probability of specified extreme events
such as collapse of a major ice sheet. Even here,
however, the connections remain underdeveloped.
IPCC assessments have gradually moved from simply
reporting a range for climate sensitivity to providing a
qualitative description of a right-skewed distribution,
plus reports of model ensemble results as collections
of separate scenarios. However, these assessments
have never stated a full probability distribution.
Many subsequent analyses using diverse methods
have developed full probability distributions, but
the distributions so produced have varied widely,
reflecting the diverse judgments of the individual
researchers producing them. Attempts to quantify
damage uncertainties remain similarly few and
ad hoc.38 Consequently, attempts to connect formal
analysis of uncertainty in climate decision models
with uncertainty as represented by current collective
judgments of scientific experts remain largely
conjectural.
Further work is also needed in representing
how knowledge advances. Most current studies have
assumed learning occurs exogenously with time, does
not depend on near-term decisions, and has no cost.
In Kolstad’s terms,23 learning is ‘autonomous’, in
contrast to ‘purchased’ learning (acquired through
costly research and development) and ‘active’ learning
(generated by near-term investments, policies, or
decisions other than just spending money, including
‘learning by doing’ from cumulative investment).
But the actual advance of knowledge may be more
limited and its mechanisms more complex than has
been assumed. Learning might not be predominantly
autonomous, but might instead reflect a blend of all
three mechanisms. Moreover, the relative importance
of the different mechanisms may differ for different
types of uncertainties: e.g., it may differ between
scientific uncertainties about climate change risks and
technological or economic uncertainties that influence
costs of mitigation and adaptation responses.
Incorporating either purchased or active learning
into sequential decision studies requires broadening
the choice set at each point beyond current period
mitigation effort, to include some form of research
effort or investment in technology. Studies that have
incorporated these mechanisms into representations of
technological change have found that these strongly
influence estimates of future mitigation costs.39–43
These have shown that gaining potentially valuable
knowledge warrants investing in research, but the cost
of acquiring the knowledge, which is itself uncertain,
must be included in value-of-information calculations.
Moreover, if specific near-term actions contribute to
decision-relevant learning through ‘learning by doing’
or similar ‘purchased learning’ mechanisms, those
actions are favored at the margin by the expected value
of the information they provide. But while alternative
models of learning have divergent implications for
near-term action, the relative importance of different
learning processes in resolving key decision-relevant
uncertainties remains weakly understood. The specific
implications for near-term climate action, beyond
general guidance to invest in knowledge, thus remain
unclear.
Another possibility requiring further exploration
is that key scientific uncertainties related to climate
change risks may not decrease as fast or easily as
has been assumed. Several mechanisms have been
proposed that might obscure or delay learning. For
example, because uncertainty in climate sensitivity
comes mainly from the uncertain strengths of various
feedbacks that affect sensitivity nonlinearly, even
large declines in feedback uncertainties will bring
much smaller declines in sensitivity uncertainty.44
Moreover, studies of uncertainty and learning have
routinely assumed well-behaved distributions with
thin tails, when the tails of distributions of important
climate change risks may actually be fat, lending
greatly increased (but unknown) probability to the
extreme outcomes that dominate concern about
climate change. Fat-tailed distributions would imply
greatly increased value to learning about the risk
of extreme outcomes, yet their structure also imposes
strict limits on the ability to achieve such learning.45–47
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In addition, because climate exhibits variabil-
ity over years and decades and because the processes
of observation, calculation, and analysis that lead
to learning are themselves subject to random vari-
ation, the process of learning is itself subject to
various errors. Rather than learning about speci-
fied uncertainties proceeding monotonically toward
tighter distributions and closer correspondence with
reality, what looks like learning can sometimes pro-
duce increasing errors. Examples of such ‘negative
learning’ have been identified retrospectively in other
contexts, including projections of ozone loss, stability
of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, and population and
energy dynamics.48 Negative learning can arise from
variability in natural processes subject to observation,
use of incorrect models, or other processes, and can
persist for years or decades, calling into question pro-
posals for short-term adaptation of decisions based on
new observations that are presumed to be reliable.8
Finally, climate change assessment and decisions may
be subject to ‘unknown unknowns’, i.e., factors omit-
ted from previous analyses because their existence
or importance was not recognized. Acknowledging
the possibility of these provides an alternative way
to describe instances of negative learning, as well as
the many instances where quantitative uncertainty in
specified parameters has not decreased over time as
expected.
What are the implications of these ongoing
studies for near-term decisions? Since they call into
question strong assumptions of decisive near-term
resolution of uncertainties, their principal implication
is that near-term decisions should avoid relying
on such assumptions. Instead, they suggest two
alternative directions, both for near-term decisions
and for analyses that seek to inform them. First,
they suggest that one contribution of analysis
can be clarifying what future observations or
other information is likely to be most useful to
inform future decisions. Current analysis can seek
to identify how preferred future choices would
depend on changed information about currently
recognized uncertainties—thereby advancing current
understanding of what future decision-makers are
most likely to want to know—and what current
research or monitoring is most likely to improve
prospects for timely (and correct) learning on these
key points.
Second, these studies suggest the value of
developing decision strategies that are robust to
major uncertainties. Various studies have suggested
that robust strategies can be identified that yield
acceptable outcomes under a wide range of assumed
resolution of uncertainties about climate sensitivity,
impacts, and costs of mitigation, while best-estimate
strategies based on specific values of uncertainties can
fail badly when their assumptions are wrong.49,50
Most approaches to robust strategies, however,
involve adapting choices over time in response to
new information. They consequently depend on the
availability of sufficiently informative observations to
shape beneficial adaptations and on the ability and
willingness of future decision-makers to act on these,
consistent with long-term goals. Such strategies are
thus vulnerable to ‘unknown unknowns’ and other
negative learning processes. When there is judged to be
a significant risk of these, which has not been mitigated
by reasonable efforts to identify more potential risk
processes and improve monitoring and analysis, the
design of robust strategies should seek to limit their
vulnerability to these processes through their choice
of what observations are used as the basis for future
adaptation, made with what frequency and with what
form of corroboration. The risk of these processes
also suggests more general advice, to recognize
that analyses and decisions are always subject to
unanticipated errors and that uncertainty bounds
should be drawn wider than appears necessary, to
embrace the paradox of ‘expecting to be surprised’.
Characterizing the Structure
of Intertemporal Choice and Constraint
While the choice set available to real climate decision-
makers can be quite rich in the range of interactions
potentially present among choices at different times,
studies of sequential decision-making have so far
used a highly simplified structure for intertemporal
decisions. Decisions, usually a single dimension of
mitigation stringency, are made by a single unitary
actor at two fixed time points. The earlier decision
only affects the later one by changing the marginal
costs and benefits of alternative second-period choices.
Of the various simplifications in this representation,
representing just two decision points is probably the
least serious. Generalizations to multiple decision
points at fixed times or to continuously variable
choices are clearly feasible, but are unlikely to
generate starkly different results from the two-period
frameworks so long as they retain the same structural
elements, i.e., that decisions are not linked across time
and that decision-makers expect more knowledge to
be available at future decision points.
More promising directions for further study
would involve representing specific linkages and
interactions between choices at different times,
through which today’s decisions can influence
future decision opportunities, constraints, payoffs, or
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knowledge, or interactions among these at different
future times. Representing such interactions will
typically require broadening the set of choices
considered at each time, and may also require moving
from a single-actor to a multi-actor perspective.
Moreover, the diversity and subtlety of such potential
choices and linkages among them are challenging to
model. Yet, these interactions may be high priorities
for analysis, because they may represent the strongest
opportunities today’s decisions have to influence the
complete time path of responses to climate change.
Current decisions can influence future decisions
in several ways, some inadvertent or unrecognized
today and others, to varying degrees, evident and
thus potentially intentional. Today’s decision-makers
can seek to expand or contract the set of future
options available, change the incentives of future
actors by changing the costs or benefits of their
choices, or change the expected state of knowledge
in which future decisions will be made. More
concretely, today’s decision-makers can articulate
long-term goals or strategies, create policies, laws,
or programs with various provisions for longevity
or future reconsideration built into them, establish
institutions or procedures that seek to bias future
choices in some particular way (including devices such
as endowments, trusts, or constitutional provisions
that are intentionally difficult to change), or conduct
research, development, or new investments that will
leave an accumulated stock of physical capital,
technology, or knowledge to future decision-makers.
Certain constraints or biases may operate on
future decisions, which can be represented as various
forms of path dependence or socioeconomic inertia.51
Even if today’s decision-makers cannot influence
these processes, if they have some knowledge of
how the processes operate there can be implications
for preferred action today. For example, Webster52
modeled several forms of path dependency that may
restrict the flexibility of future policy adjustment.
Consistent with other studies of hedging and
irreversibility, path dependency of policy that limits
future adjustments in a particular direction tends to
favor initial movements in that direction as a hedge.
For example, obstacles to future strengthening of
action tend to favor stronger action today. If today’s
actors perceive that they have a time-limited window
of opportunity for action that is unlikely to recur, they
should do more today than if future opportunities for
action are unconstrained. More broadly, Webster’s
analysis argued for the plausibility of such constraints,
and thus against blithely assuming radical future
policy shifts will be easy as a justification for weak
action today.
Webster’s analysis concerned the effect on
today’s decisions of future decision structures that
today’s decision-makers can perceive but not influ-
ence. It is also possible that today’s decision-makers
may be able to influence future decision opportu-
nities. For example, today’s actors may have some
control over the persistence of their decisions. Private
investors may respond to climate change with var-
ious mixes of shorter- and longer-lived investments,
while policy-makers may specify various durations for
treaty review, legislative reauthorization, assessment
processes, or program funding. These decisions under
uncertainty are analytically parallel to many finan-
cial decisions that have been thoroughly analyzed,
in which today’s actors choose between shorter- and
longer-term investments or obligations (e.g., invest-
ing in a 1-year or 10-year CD or borrowing on an
adjustable-rate mortgage or a 30-year fixed).
Today’s actors may also enact policies that
explicitly attempt to influence future choices. Merely
stating default trajectories for some policy measures
(e.g., a trajectory of emissions or emission prices
over time), or stating requirements or targets for
distant-future dates may exert rhetorical influence,
and thus some degree of real influence over
future decisions, even where future decision-makers
have formal authority to modify any expenditure,
regulation, or law enacted today. Other decisions,
such as procedural requirements for future decision-
makers to revisit issues or act on certain findings,
establishing institutions, or creating constitutional or
quasi-constitutional obligations with associated rights
of action, may exert stronger influence on future
decisions, even if their specific future effects may be
hard to control or anticipate.
To the extent that much influence on future
decisions comes from the inherited structure of the
economy, technology, and capital stock, today’s
decisions can also exert future influence by changing
these inherited stocks and thereby the marginal
costs and benefits of future actions. In this respect,
today’s decision-makers may choose to depart
from the apparent intertemporal optimal decision
trajectory to exert control over future decision-
makers. Examples might include investing in energy
sector capital that reduces the marginal cost of future
mitigation or front-loading the costs of building future
capacity for low-cost response, whether mitigation or
adaptation. Today’s decisions regarding alternative
policy mechanisms can also influence future decisions
by creating constituencies with foreseeable interests
in the future trajectory of the policy. Examples might
include policies that create long-lived classes of assets,
such as emission allowances, whose holders will have
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an interest in defending the future value of their
assets by resisting attempts to weaken the emissions
constraint that gives them value.53,54
In contrast to intertemporal analyses that
assume either a single decision-maker over time
or full cooperation between current and future
actors in managing climate change, many aspects
of intertemporal decision-making can be represented
as strategic interactions between current and future
actors. These interactions are necessarily one-way,
because current and future actors cannot bargain with
each other, and future actors have no way to influence
current actors but must simply act in the situation
that is left to them. Yet current actors’ choices may
be influenced in various ways by their expectations
of what future actors are likely to do, or value, in
two ways. Current actors might want to ensure that
climate change is adequately managed over time but
not trust future actors to do their part. In this case,
current decision-makers might attempt to influence
future choices by making investments today that lower
future marginal costs, generally by making more effort
and incurring more cost today than would otherwise
be preferred.55 Alternatively, current actors might
assume future decision-makers will act responsibly,
but seek to avoid costs themselves by pushing more
of the burden onto the future, in effect giving them
the ‘last clear chance’ to avoid serious harms.33 These
interactions are closely related to the intertemporal
structure of preferences, both in how today’s actors
value effects at various future times and in what
today’s actors assume about future actors’ valuations
of effects over time. Today’s actors’ preferred choices
can depend strongly on what they assume about
future actors’ evaluation of climate change risks and
willingness to bear costs to limit climate change. These
assumptions are related to the evolution over time
in trade-offs between environmental damages and
monetary costs, and also to future actors’ expectation
of how these trade-offs will vary further in the future
and their trade-offs between themselves and others
still further in the future. These potential interactions
can have high stakes for current decisions, but have
been little examined.
In addition to strategic interactions between
present and future actors, a sequential decision
perspective can also influence strategic interactions
among current actors, e.g., among policy-makers
in different nations negotiating over their respec-
tive efforts to manage climate change today. These
negotiations take place under uncertainty about costs
and benefits, on which various actors’ assessments
may diverge, as well as uncertainty about others’
actions, now and in the future. In this setting, several
studies using simple stylized models have suggested
that introducing sequential decisions with the prospect
of future learning can obstruct cooperative action.
Consequently, availability of information can reduce
collective welfare, making the value of the information
negative—a result that is impossible in the single-actor
case.32
Related to these strategic interactions, today’s
actors also have opportunities to influence future
decisions by designing policies that distribute the
control over future adjustment among different actors.
Tradable permit systems provide an illustration,
especially when permits are long lived, conferring
a right to emit one unit any time the holder chooses
over an extended period, rather than in a specified
year. Such policies delegate substantial control over
the intertemporal profile of emissions and their prices
to actors operating in private markets. Such delegation
can have risk-reducing benefits. For example, Webster
et al.56 calculated that international emissions trading
carried substantial hedge value. But such approaches
can also subject future adjustments to risks of
short-term price volatility and market manipulation,
thereby increasing adjustment costs and weakening
required incentives for long-term investment and
development of emission-reducing technologies. In
contrast, policies such as short-duration emission
permits, emission taxes, or conventional regulations
keep control over the path of future adjustments in
government hands, whether legislators or regulatory
agencies. The choice of policy mechanisms is thus
partly a choice of which actors are trusted to make
future decisions consistent with effective long-term
management of climate change. Current analyses
have little to say on this choice, because they mostly
examine ideal, maximally efficient policies, sometimes
modified by specific limitations such as some regions
delaying accession to global regimes or specified
forms of path dependence limiting future adjustment.
In contrast, the choice among policy mechanisms
strongly implicates judgments of how much and in
what ways future decisions by particular actors are
likely to depart from the ideal. In principle, such
departures can be incorporated into formal analyses
by introducing additional uncertainties about the
design, implementation, and effectiveness of policies




Just as today’s decision-makers cannot specify a com-
plete trajectory of future climate change responses,
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today’s analyses cannot inform such a complete future
trajectory. The reason to study climate decisions,
whether through formal models, scenario exercises,
political and institutional analyses, or other means,
is to inform current decisions. Examining the sequen-
tial character of future climate decisions is not an
abstract or impractical exercise, however, because this
sequential character affects preferred choices today in
many ways. Analyses of sequential decisions have pro-
vided several broad insights into preferred near-term
choices. For example, they have demonstrated that
some level of action is preferred now under a wide
range of assumptions about uncertain quantities and
processes; that delay in actions to limit emissions can
put many potentially desirable future trajectories out
of reach; and that there is value in near-term steps
to advance knowledge and take actions likely to be
informative. But the debate has been less useful for
informing near-term policy choices than it might have.
In part, this has reflected the appropriation of ana-
lytic discussions into broader political debates over
the advisability of early action, with resultant loss of
precision.
Making analyses of sequential decisions more
useful will require taking more account of the specific
responsibilities, authority, resources, and interests of
particular decision-makers. Extending lines of cur-
rent work sketched in the previous section, analyses
could provide additional insights into several high-
priority questions of concern to current policy-makers.
For example, studies are needed to help inform the
appropriate balance of effort between policies promot-
ing research and development and regulatory policies
implementing immediate incentives or requirements to
reduce emissions. The preferred balance will depend
on the mix of alternative causal processes influencing
the advance of scientific knowledge and technologi-
cal capability. Studies are also needed to inform the
design of strategies to promote research, development,
and demonstration of low-emitting and non-emitting
technologies. These choices depend in part on the
structure of uncertainties presumed to be most impor-
tant to future decision-makers, including information
that will be most valuable in informing their decisions,
and current investments and initiatives that can most
effectively increase the probability of that information
being available when it is needed. Studies are needed
to inform decisions regarding the duration of current
commitments. For private investors, this means iden-
tifying preferred portfolios of short- versus long-lived
investments under specified climate-related uncertain-
ties they face, including climate policy. For policy-
makers, it means identifying analogous portfolios
of durations of regulations, laws, and expenditure
programs under specified uncertainties including the
response to policies by private actors and markets.
Current policy-makers face decisions regarding
various matters of institutional design that are likely
to strongly influence the long-term policy response.
For example, in conjunction with setting the dura-
tion of initial programs and commitments, current
actors can also establish the structure and frequency
of future policy adjustments—at least as an initial
default—by specifying what dimensions of policy are
considered for revision, how frequently, with what
lead-times or other constraints on future changes,
and subject to what procedural requirements such as
required findings or inputs from expert assessments.
These decisions should be informed by consideration
of the balance between the costs of changing policies
too frequently or with too little notice, thereby raising
adjustment costs and potentially weakening incen-
tives for long-term research and investments and the
cost of changing policies too infrequently or slowly,
thereby increasing the divergence from ideal policies
over time. Analyses using alternative representations
of the structure of relevant costs and uncertainties can
contribute to informing these decisions.
Current policy-makers also face decisions
regarding the broad allocation of authority and
constraint between themselves and future actors,
and design of specific institutions and processes
to implement this division of authority. Designing
adaptive systems for sequential decision-making
requires asking what future conditions should
be considered in making future adjustments, and
thus what should be monitored and how future
decisions should respond to alternative results of the
monitoring. This holds for private decision-makers
and policy-makers at both national and international
levels. While there are unavoidable elements of
speculation involved in making these decisions, the
decisions do have to be made. Taking decisions
beyond speculation requires analyses of alternative
specific adaptive strategy designs to examine their
performance under realistic alternative specifications
of uncertainties, advancing knowledge, and the
interests and capabilities of future decision-makers. At
the same time, it is necessary to increase the robustness
of such strategies to various specifications of delayed
learning, negative learning, and inconsistent or
suboptimal decision-making.
A sequential perspective is valuable for
informing multiple types of climate-related decisions,
public and private, because this structure has major
implications for what near-term choices are preferred.
Many aspects of current climate decisions involve
subtle matters of institutional design, allocation of
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authority between governmental and expert bodies,
current and future actors, or construction of politically
feasible policies. These aspects pose severe challenges
for formal modeling and analysis. Still, there are many
opportunities to enrich current analytic approaches,
including exploratory and illustrative analyses of
uncertainties such as these, to usefully inform current
climate decisions in light of the large-scale structure
of sequential decision-making.
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